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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
Climate Litigation in Financial Markets:
A Typology†
Javier Solana*
Abstract
Over the past few years, the number of climate cases being ﬁled against corporations and pub-
lic authorities around the world has been on the rise. Aware of the central role of ﬁnance in
economic development, the ﬁnancial sector has remained vigilant. Traditionally, climate liti-
gation in ﬁnancial markets had been rare, but that seems to be changing: in 2018 there were
more cases ﬁled than in any previous year. The development of existing and forthcoming pri-
vate and public sector initiatives with the aim of promoting sustainable ﬁnance may usher in
even greater numbers in the next few years. This article provides the ﬁrst systematic overview
of climate cases in ﬁnancial markets and introduces a typology to classify this type of climate
case. This classiﬁcation reveals common issues across different ﬁnancial systems and raises
questions for further enquiry that deﬁne a new research area within the emerging literature
on climate litigation.
Keywords: Climate change, Climate litigation, Climate ﬁnance, Sustainable ﬁnance,
Disclosure, Fiduciary duties
1. 
Mobilizing ﬁnance is essential for addressing the climate crisis effectively. It is essential
to support mitigation actions that aim to reduce emissions that aggravate climate
change, and to support actions that aim to adapt to the adverse effects and reduce
the impacts of a changing climate.1 I shall refer to ﬁnance that aims to support these
mitigation and adaptation actions as ‘climate ﬁnance’.2
† This contribution is part of a collection of articles growing out of the conference ‘Climate Change
Litigation’, held at Aarhus University Department of Law, Aarhus (Denmark), 14–15 June 2018.
* University of Glasgow School of Law, Glasgow (United Kingdom (UK)).
Email: Javier.solana@glasgow.ac.uk.
I would like to thank Peter Barnett, IainMacNeil, and two anonymous referees for their useful comments
and feedback on earlier versions of this article. All errors are my own.
1 See UN Climate Change, ‘Introduction to Climate Finance’, 2019, available at: https://unfccc.int/topics/
climate-ﬁnance/the-big-picture/introduction-to-climate-ﬁnance.
2 This article adheres to the UN’s broad understanding of the term ‘climate ﬁnance’ in the context of the
UNFCCC (n. 3 below): ‘Climate ﬁnance refers to local, national or transnational ﬁnancing—drawn
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Since the 21st Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),3 held in Paris (France) in December
2015,4 the promotion of climate ﬁnance has become a prominent political issue in
many countries around the world.5 According to the latest report from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations (UN) body
for assessing the science related to climate change, the world needs to invest USD 2.4
trillion in clean energy every year between 2016 and 2035 to keep global temperatures
within 1.5°C of pre-industrial levels.6 In the European Union (EU) alone, achieving the
2030 targets agreed in Paris will require an additional investment of EUR 180 billion
per year.7 Conscious of the limitations of public ﬁnances, in March 2018 the
European Commission presented an action plan that aims to incentivize the ﬁnancial
sector to ﬁll that investment gap.8 Other countries have recently adopted, or are in
the process of adopting, similar measures.9
In recent years there has also been a growing number of climate litigation cases. As of
May 2018, more than 1,000 cases had been ﬁled in 25 jurisdictions.10 Most of these
cases have been ﬁled against public authorities and corporations, mainly in the fossil
from public, private and alternative sources of ﬁnancing—that seeks to support mitigation and adapta-
tion actions that will address climate change’: UN Climate Change, ibid.
3 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
4 For an overview of the introduction of climate ﬁnance into the negotiations of the UNFCCC and its
accompanying protocols and agreements, see UN Climate Change, ‘Climate Finance’, 2019, available
at: https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-ﬁnance/the-big-picture/climate-ﬁnance-in-the-negotiations.
5 China and the European Union (EU) have taken a leading role. See, e.g., The People’s Bank of China, The
Ministry of Finance, National Development and Reform Commission, The Ministry of Environment
Protection, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission & China
Insurance Regulatory Commission, ‘Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System’, 31 Aug.
2016, available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/3133045/index.html; Communication from the
European Commission, ‘Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth’, 8 Mar. 2018, COM(2018)97 ﬁnal,
available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097 (EC Sustainable
Finance Action Plan).
6 This represents approximately 2.5% of the world’s gross domestic product: IPCC, ‘Global Warming of
1.5°C: Summary for Policy Makers’, Oct. 2018, para. D.5.3, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15.
7 EC Sustainable Finance Action Plan, n. 5 above, p. 2.
8 Ibid. Shortly thereafter, the European Commission adopted a package of measures implementing several
key actions announced in its action plan: European Commission, ‘Sustainable Finance’, available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-ﬁnance/sustainable-ﬁnance_en.
9 Together with the EU, China has taken a leading role in promoting sustainable ﬁnance. See, e.g., the
Green Investment Guidelines adopted by the Asset Management Association of China, 10 Nov. 2018,
available at: http://www.gﬂp.org.cn/index/index/newsdetail/id/31.html; and H. Peng, X. Lu &
C. Zhou, ‘Introduction to China’s Green Finance System’ (2018) 11(1) Journal of Service Science and
Management, pp. 94–100. In the United Kingdom (UK) and California (United States (US)), recent legis-
lative initiatives will require pension funds to start disclosing their climate change strategy as soon as Oct.
2019: see S. Rust, ‘DWP Drops “Statement on Member Views” Requirement from ESG Rules’, IPE,
11 Sept. 2018, available at: https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/dwp-drops-statement-on-member-views-
requirement-from-esg-rules/10026589.article; J. Thompson, ‘California Turns up the Heat on Climate
Change Disclosures’, Financial Times, 29 Sept. 2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/
a4c8fffa-869a-3e76-8e05-e8acc572d293.
10 See M. Nachmany & J. Setzer, ‘Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation: 2018
Snapshot’, Grantham Research Institute Report, May 2018, p. 5, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Global-trends-in-climate-change-legislation-and-litigation-
2018-snapshot-3.pdf.
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Transnational Environmental Law2
fuel industry.11 Climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets is a relatively recent phenom-
enon, but the number of cases is increasing rapidly: in 2018 more cases were ﬁled
than in any previous year. Moreover, the growing prominence of climate ﬁnance in pol-
itical agendas worldwide is leading to new private and public sector initiatives that will
arguably usher in even more cases in the next few years.12
In parallel, a growing body of academic literature explores climate litigation.
According to Peel and Osofsky,13 this literature explores climate litigation from three
angles. One body of literature provides detailed analyses of speciﬁc climate cases or
examines developments in climate litigation in speciﬁc jurisdictions.14 Another
attempts to systematize the different cases in climate litigation;15 and a third aims to
explore the role of litigation in the governance of climate change.16
Climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets has not attracted as much attention from aca-
demics as other types of climate case.17 In addition, the few academic studies that
explore climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets tend to focus on very speciﬁc claims
and are circumscribed to individual jurisdictions.18 So far, no attempt has been
made to classify the different types of case.
This article provides the ﬁrst systematic overview of climate cases in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. The analysis covers all cases ﬁled before 31 December 2018 that meet certain cri-
teria speciﬁed in Section 2. Section 3 summarizes all the relevant cases, using a typology
11 Ibid.
12 See, e.g., Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), ‘Final Report: Recommendations of
the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures’, 29 June 2017, available at: https://www.fsb-tcfd.
org/publications/ﬁnal-recommendations-report; Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘The Impact of Climate
Change on the UK Insurance Sector’, Sept. 2015, pp. 57–65, available at: https://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/-/media/boe/ﬁles/prudential-regulation/publication/impact-of-climate-change-on-the-uk-insurance-
sector.pdf.
13 See J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky, ‘Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways and the Administrative State: Lessons
from U.S. and Australian Climate Change Governance’ (2013) 25 Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review, pp. 207–59, at 210–11.
14 For prominent examples of this literature, see the list of works in J. Setzer & M. Bangalore, ‘Regulating
Climate Change in the Courts’, in A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser & M. Nachmany (eds), Trends in
Climate Change Legislation (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 175–92, at 177.
15 Ibid., pp. 177–8.
16 Ibid., pp. 178–80. For a more recent review on the literature, see J. Setzer & L. Vanhala, ‘Climate Change
Litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and Litigants in Climate Government (2019) 10(3) Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change online articles, available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/abs/10.1002/wcc.580.
17 N. 10 above.
18 See, e.g., P. Wallace, ‘Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law Duties’ (2009) 44(3)Wake
Forest Law Review, pp. 757–76; S. Barker, ‘Directors Duties in the Anthropocene: Personal Liability for
Corporate Inaction on Climate Change’ (Master’s thesis, University of Melbourne, Victoria (Australia),
2013), available at: http://responsible-investmentbanking.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Directors-
Duties-in-the-Anthropocene-December-2013.pdf; M. Gold & A. Scotchmer, ‘Climate Change and
Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund Trustees in Canada’, Koskie Minsky LLP, 18 Sept. 2015, available at:
https://www.turnbackthetide.ca/tools-and-resources/whatsnew/2015/KoskieMinskyLLP.pdf; S. Barker
et al., ‘Climate Change and the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund Trustees: Lessons from the Australian
Law’ (2016) 6(3) Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, pp. 211–44; G. Erion, ‘The Stock Market
to the Rescue? Carbon Disclosure and the Future of Securities-Related Climate Change Litigation’ (2009)
18(2) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 164–71; J. Solana,
‘The Power of the Eurosystem to Promote Environmental Protection’, (2019) European Business Law
Review (forthcoming), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3241341.
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Javier Solana 3
to classify them according to the underpinning claims. This section also considers how
climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets might evolve on the basis of existing climate cases
in other industries and/or existing non-climate cases in the ﬁnancial sector. Section 4
concludes by tracing potential avenues of future research.
2.    
2.1. Case Selection Methodology
Before presenting the typology, a few methodological clariﬁcations are necessary in
order to understand the scope of the review. A fundamental question is what constitutes
‘climate change litigation’ (or ‘climate litigation’ for short). The concept has two clear
elements: the ‘climate change’ element and the ‘litigation’ element. The deﬁnition
adopted is based on a narrow scope of the ﬁrst element and a broad scope of the second.
Peel andOsofsky have conceptualized the ﬁrst element of the deﬁnition using a series of
concentric circles. In the innermost circle or ‘core’, litigation has climate change as a
central issue; in the three outer circles, climate change becomes a more peripheral
issue.19 The deﬁnition of ‘climate change litigation’ adopted here includes cases at
the ‘core’ of the framework and in the second innermost circle – cases with climate
change as the central issue, and cases with climate change as one of the key issues.
In relation to the second element, I adopt a relatively broad interpretation of ‘litiga-
tion’. It goes beyond judicial authorities to include administrative bodies with regula-
tory enforcement powers and the authority to issue binding decisions, as well as
claims that have not yet been resolved.20 In the speciﬁc context of ﬁnancial markets,
this includes ordinary courts as well as ﬁnancial supervisory authorities and ombuds-
man schemes. The deﬁnition, however, includes only cases of an adversarial nature.
Adversarial cases may include situations where there is only one party if that party’s
motivation for initiating legal proceedings is litigious, such as ﬁling a complaint against
a ﬁnancial institution before a supervisory authority.
The focus of the analysis is on ﬁnancial markets. Following Armour and his
co-authors, ﬁnancial systems play ﬁve roles:
(i) providing a secure mechanism for payments at a distance; (ii) mobilizing capital from
savers who have more ﬁnancial resources than uses for them; (iii) selecting projects from
amongst those seeking investment to capital; (iv)monitoring the performance of those exe-
cuting projects in which investment has been made; and (v) managing risk.21
19 The three other circles include, in order of proximity to the core: (i) litigation with climate change as a
peripheral issue; (ii) litigation with climate change as one motivation but not raised as an issue, e.g.,
cases against coal brought on environmental grounds; and (iii) litigation with no speciﬁc climate change
framing but implications for mitigation or adaptation, e.g., fracking cases: J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky,
Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (Cambridge University Press,
2015), p. 8.
20 This is in linewith empirical analyses of climate litigation: see, e.g., D.Markell& J.B. Ruhl, ‘AnEmpirical
Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual’ (2012) 64(1)
Florida Law Review, pp. 15–86, at 27.
21 J. Armour et al., Principles of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 22–3 (emphasis
in original).
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Transnational Environmental Law4
As a result, most cases examined in this article involve the provision of ﬁnancial
services that fall into at least one of those ﬁve categories and are typically documented
in a contract. They include the execution of ﬁnancial transactions such as insurance,
loans and other credit facilities, and the sale and purchase of equity and debt securities.
Importantly, this deﬁnition captures cases that involve two ﬁnancial actors (e.g., a bank
makes a loan to another bank), ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial actors (e.g., a bank makes a
loan to an oil company), and two non-ﬁnancial actors (e.g., an individual investor pur-
chases equity securities issued by an oil company). As a result, the ﬁnancial nature of the
actors is not an essential criterion. Moreover, the ﬁnancial transactions falling within
the scope of the deﬁnition need not be restricted to climate ﬁnance. For example, non-
ﬁnancial corporations raising ﬁnance in capital markets to develop projects that do not
necessarily seek to advance climate change adaptation or mitigation projects are
included. However, the projects being ﬁnanced may have a different connection with
climate change – namely, a seemingly negative impact.
The identiﬁcation of cases has relied primarily on two specialized databases: the
Sabin Center for Climate Change Climate Litigation Chart (Sabin database)22 and
the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Climate
Change Laws of the World (GRI database).23 Both databases are updated regularly
through standard legal research methods. As of 31 December 2018, the Sabin database
contained 977 cases under ‘U.S. Litigation’ and 275 cases under ‘Non-U.S. Litigation’,
and the GRI database contained 274 cases, which exclude United States (US) litigation.
A search of these databases using keywords such as ‘ﬁnanc*’, ‘equity’, ‘debt’, ‘secur-
ities’, ‘loan’ returned 46 cases that met the deﬁnitions described in the preceding para-
graphs. Most of these cases were in the US (23). Other jurisdictions where cases were
found include Australia (11), the United Kingdom (UK) (8), Canada (2), Germany
(1) and Poland (1). The preponderance of cases in these jurisdictions is in line with
broader surveys of climate litigation.24
2.2. Climate Litigation Typologies
Most systematic analyses of climate litigation in the academic literature adopt typolo-
gies that focus on the types of claim that underpin the cases.25 Following this general-
ized approach, I have distinguished eight types of claim by analyzing the 46 cases
identiﬁed in the database search that meet the deﬁnitions presented above and by
22 Database available at: http://climatecasechart.com.
23 Database available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world.
24 See Nachmany & Setzer, n. 10 above.
25 See, e.g., N.S. Gahleigh, ‘“Six Honest Serving-Men”: Climate Change Litigation as Legal Mobilization
and the Utility of Typologies’ (2010) 1(1) Climate Law, pp. 31–61; B.J. Preston, ‘Climate Change
Litigation (Part 1)’ (2011) 5(1) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 3–14; B.J. Preston, ‘Climate
Change Litigation (Part 2)’ (2011) 5(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 244–63; D. Markell &
J.B. Ruhl, n. 20 above; M. Wilensky, ‘Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S.
Climate Litigation’ (2015) 26(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, pp. 131–79; Setzer &
Bangalore, n. 14 above.
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Javier Solana 5
reﬂecting on existing or upcoming regulatory initiatives that aim to promote sustain-
able ﬁnance. As a result, each type of claim may include one or several of the 46
cases identiﬁed in the search, one or several potential cases, or a combination of
both. Under each category of claims, when climate cases have been identiﬁed in ﬁnan-
cial markets, these are examined ﬁrst. Potential cases are examined last. Where appro-
priate, sub-types of claim are identiﬁed under each category.
3.   
3.1. Fundamental Rights
There is an increasing trend to incorporate rights claims in climate litigation cases and a
growing receptivity of courts to this framing.26 Most fundamental rights arguments
rely on the protection of the right to life,27 the right to home and family life,28 the
right to a safe and healthy environment,29 and the right to human dignity.30 An analysis
of these rights-based climate cases reveals that, so far, fundamental rights have under-
pinned claims that seek to advance and promote climate regulation (‘pro-regulatory’
cases). Litigants have not relied on fundamental rights to challenge climate regulation
(‘anti-regulatory’ cases).31
There is at least one case in which human rights were invoked as an argument to
challenge a ﬁnancial investment. In 2008, the UK government provided major ﬁnancial
support to Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), which resulted in the government owning
70% of the issued shared capital in the bank. In RBS, the claimant sought permission
to bring judicial review proceedings in relation to the policy adopted by the UK
Treasury in its investment in RBS, arguing, among other things, that the said policy
was unlawful on human rights grounds under section 6 of the Human Rights Act
1998.32 This section provides a general prohibition on public authorities against acting
26 See J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7(1) Transnational
Environmental Law, pp. 37–67, 48–60.
27 See Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the
Environment), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396
(Urgenda); Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 25501/2015), Lahore High Court
Green Bench, Orders of 4 Sept. and 14 Sept. 2015 (Leghari), para. 7; Juliana v. United States, No.
6:15-cv-01517, (D.Or., 10 Nov. 2016) (Aiken, J.) 46 ELR 20175 (Juliana).
28 See Urgenda, ibid.
29 See Leghari, n. 27 above, para. 7; Case No. W109 2000179-1/291E, Federal Administrative Court,
Austria, 2 Feb. 2017 (Vienna International Airport); Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of
Environmental Affairs & Others, Case No. 65662/16, Judgment of the High Court of South Africa,
Gauteng Division, Pretoria (South Africa), 8 Mar. 2017.
30 Ibid. Other fundamental rights arguments rely on the right to liberty and property (see Juliana, n. 27
above) and the principles of sustainability and environmental protection (see Leghari, n. 27 above,
para. 7; Vienna International Airport, ibid.).
31 For an analysis of this typology, see Peel & Osofsky, n. 19 above, pp. 30–2.
32 SeeTheQueen (on the Application of People and Planet) v.HMTreasury, High Court of Justice, Queen’s
Bench Division, Administrative Court, 20 Oct. 2009, [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin) (RBS), para. 10.
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Transnational Environmental Law6
in a way that is incompatible with a ‘Convention right’.33 The court, however, dis-
missed the claim without discussing it in substance.34
In line with the trend observed in climate litigation more generally, there are no
known ‘anti-regulatory’ climate cases in ﬁnancial markets that rely on fundamental
rights arguments. Nevertheless, there are precedents where investors and other inter-
ested parties have challenged policy measures, alleging that their fundamental rights
had been violated. For example, in the context of the same ﬁnancial crisis that led
the UK government to support RBS, the government also supported another bank,
Northern Rock. Unlike RBS, however, Northern Rock was ultimately taken into public
ownership. The legislation that effected the nationalization of Northern Rock provided
for the assessment by an independent valuer of compensation payable to the bank’s
shareholders. In addition, the statutory instrument making provision for the determin-
ation of the compensation payable by the UK Treasury to the bank’s shareholders
required the independent valuer to assume that Northern Rock was unable to continue
as a going concern and was in administration. This effectively meant that there would
be no residual value in the company and that shareholders would be paid no
compensation.35
In Grainger, several shareholders of Northern Rock challenged the decision of the
UK government to nationalize the bank before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) on the grounds that the decision had been disproportionate, alleging,
among other things, that ‘two other major United Kingdom institutions, [RBS] and
HBOS, [had been] treated entirely differently by the Government barely a year after
the nationalisation of Northern Rock’.36 The applicants did not expressly allege a vio-
lation of the principle of non-discrimination and therefore the ECtHR did not examine
the case within that framework. Nevertheless, Grainger ushered in a series of cases in
which claimants relied on the principle of non-discrimination to challenge the manage-
ment of recent ﬁnancial crises in Iceland, Portugal, and the Netherlands.37 In these
cases, foreign investors alleged that national bank resolution authorities had given
domestic investors more favourable treatment when putting a domestic ﬁnancial insti-
tution into resolution. None of the courts in these cases, however, found that public
authorities had violated the principle of non-discrimination in treating the various
investors differently.
33 The UKHuman Rights Act (HRA) 1998 gives further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Rome (Italy), 4 Nov. 1950, in force 3 Sept. 1953,
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts). Art. 1 HRA identiﬁes the speciﬁc
provisions of the ECHR that comprise the category of ‘Convention rights’ under the HRA.
34 See RBS, n. 32 above, para. 12.
35 ECtHR, 10 Jul. 2012,Dennis Grainger andOthers v.United Kingdom, Appl. No. 34940/10 (Grainger),
paras 3–18.
36 Ibid., para. 32.
37 See EFTA Court, Case E-16/11 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority
v. Iceland, 28 Jan. 2013 [2013] EFTA Court Reports (nyr) (Icesave); ECtHR, 14 Jan. 2014, Adorisio
v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 47315/13 (Adorisio); Goldman Sachs International v. Novo Banco
S.A., UK Supreme Court, 4 July 2018 [2018] UKSC 34 (Novo Banco).
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Javier Solana 7
An analysis of the merits of these claims is beyond the scope of this article.38
Nevertheless, these cases illustrate that policy measures in ﬁnancial markets are very
susceptible to discriminatory claims, particularly during times of emergency.
Arguably, the decision to promote sustainable ﬁnance in order to accelerate the transi-
tion to a low-carbon economy could raise similar concerns among investors. For
example, there has been discussion about the feasibility of using macroprudential pol-
icy to promote sustainable ﬁnance. The two main approaches rely on adapting regula-
tory capital requirements (the amount of capital that banks have to hold to absorb
losses if their loans default) to reﬂect banks’ exposure to climate risk, for instance,
by lowering capital requirements for ‘green assets’ and/or raising them for ‘brown
assets’.39 Under either approach, banks holding more brown assets might try to chal-
lenge these newmacroprudential regulations on grounds of discrimination, particularly
if such an adaptation of capital requirements can undermine their very rationale, as
some central banks have already argued.40
In the context of bank resolution, investors have typically complemented their dis-
crimination claims with the argument that the application of regulatory measures
also violated their fundamental right to private property.41 The application of some
of these measures, such as the bail-in tool, constitutes a frontal attack on private prop-
erty because shareholders and holders of junior debt in the ﬁnancial institution are
deprived of their rights in that property.42 At ﬁrst sight, however, the implementation
of regulatory initiatives to promote sustainable ﬁnance that are known to date do not
have such dramatic implications for the right to private property: investors could con-
tinue to hold, and proﬁt from, their assets. Nevertheless, an effective policy could erode
the proﬁtability of brown assets and undermine the expectations of investors. On these
grounds, affected investors might indeed seek to challenge the policy, alleging a viola-
tion of the principle of legitimate expectation.43 A priori, however, courts are likely to
dismiss these claims.When facing similar claims, the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU), for example, have concluded that legitimate expectation
cannot arise from a situation that depends on a public authority’s exercise of a wide
political discretion.44
38 For a critical analysis of these decisions, see D. Ramos & J. Solana, ‘Fundamental Rights: A Limit to
Bail-in?’, 31 May 2019 (on ﬁle with the author).
39 ‘Green assets’ refers to assets in low-carbon industries and ‘brown assets’ to assets in carbon-intensive
industries: see P. D’Orazio & L Popoyan, ‘Fostering Green Investments and Tackling Climate-Related
Financial Risks: Which Role for Macroprudential Policies?’, LEM Working Paper Series ISSN
(Online) 2284-0400 2018/33, 12 Nov. 2018, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3106350.
40 See, e.g., J. Dankert et al., ‘AGreen Supporting Factor: The Right Policy?’, SUERF Policy Note, Issue No.
43, Oct. 2018, available at: https://www.suerf.org/policynotes/3473/a-green-supporting-factor-the-right-
policy.
41 See, e.g., Grainger, n. 35 above, para. 33.
42 See Ramos & Solana, n. 38 above.
43 See, e.g., Case C-526/14, Tadej Kotnik and Others v. Slovenia [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 (Kotnik),
para. 65.
44 Ibid., para. 66;Grainger, n. 35 above, para. 39. Both cases conﬁrm that public authorities will enjoy wide
political discretionwhen the exercise of their powers ‘involves complex economic and social assessments’:
see, e.g., Kotnik, ibid., para. 38.
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3.2. Authority or Mandate
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 201545 there have been several
regulatory initiatives with the aim of promoting climate ﬁnance and sustainable ﬁnance
more broadly.46 In recent years ﬁnancial market participants have been very sensitive to
innovative approaches to ﬁnancial regulation and supervision, often leading to litiga-
tion. For example, the design and implementation of new measures of monetary policy
in the eurozone by the European Central Bank (ECB) has been challenged several times
before the CJEU.47 Moreover, several banks have recently challenged the ECB’s exer-
cise of its new powers as bank supervisor.48
The policy proposals that aim to promote sustainable ﬁnance are generating intense
debates among policymakers and the ﬁnancial services industry. For example, banks
and other interested parties have already expressed their concerns with regulatory
initiatives that contemplate lowering the capital requirements of banks for green ﬁnan-
cial assets.49 Public authorities’ mandates are at the heart of some of these debates.50
In such a sensitive environment, when new policy measures with the aim of promoting
sustainable ﬁnance are implemented, we can expect ﬁnancial market participants – and,
in particular, supervised institutions – to resort to litigation in an attempt to restrict
their implementation. Considering recent precedents in the EU, this litigation is likely
to focus on the scope of the mandates of public authorities to design and implement
such measures.51
On the other hand, climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets might seek to challenge the
failure of public authorities to assume a more proactive role in promoting sustainable
ﬁnance.Where these authorities’mandates do not make express reference to sustainability
45 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at: http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/
9485.php.
46 For a list of examples, see n. 9 above.
47 See, e.g., Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:
C:2012:756; Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag [2015] ECLI:EU:
C:2015:400 (Gauweiler); Case C-493/17, Heinrich Weiss and Others [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000
(Weiss).
48 See D. Ramos & J. Solana, ‘Bank Resolution and Creditor Distribution: The Tension Shaping Global
Banking – Part I: “Individual v. Bank Group” and “Ex Ante v. Ex Post” Dimensions’ (2019) 28
University of Miami Business Law Review (forthcoming); D. Ramos & J. Solana, ‘Bank Resolution
and Creditor Distribution: The Tension Shaping Global Banking – Part II: The Cross-border
Dimension’ (2019) 28 University of Miami Business Law Review (forthcoming).
49 This is a common measure across different regulatory initiatives that aim to promote sustainable
ﬁnance. See, e.g., EC Sustainable Finance Action Plan, n. 5 above, p. 9. One of the main arguments
against lowering capital requirements for green ﬁnancial assets is that there is no direct relationship
between sustainability and lower credit risk: see, e.g., F. van Lerven & J. Ryan-Collins, ‘Adjusting
Banks’ Capital Requirements in Line with Sustainable Finance Objectives’, 28 Feb. 2018, available
at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/ﬁles/brieﬁng-note-capital-
requirements-for-sustainable-ﬁnance-objectives.pdf.
50 For an overview of these debates with regard to the ECB’s mandate, see Solana, n. 18 above, pp. 2–3.
51 The European Commission has proposed broadening the scope of the mandates of the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to include the supervision of sustainability issues: see EC Sustainable
Finance Action Plan, n. 5 above, p. 12. This kind of initiative might help to forestall claims of ultra
vires but would still leave the door open to claims seeking to challenge the actual exercise of new powers.
In this context, potential claimants are likely to rely on fundamental rights arguments. See Section 3.1
above.
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Javier Solana 9
and are therefore open to interpretation, litigation will be more likely. In these cases,
plaintiffs might seek to interpret the scope of the authorities’ mandates under the
light of general principles such as the principle of integration. For instance, under EU
law, Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)52
requires public authorities to integrate environmental protection objectives when
designing and implementing EU policies and activities. Nevertheless, at least in the
EU, courts are likely to give preference to the political discretion of authorities when
designing and implementing their policy measures.53
Issues of authority might also be relevant in a private law context. For example, a
trust deed might state explicitly, among the purposes of an investment fund, that any
investment of the trust property should contribute to themitigation of the climate crisis.
If the trustees or the fund managers decide to buy shares in an oil company, some inves-
tors may be tempted to sue the trustees or the managers for breach of trust.54 A similar
set of facts, in Harvard Climate Justice, led to litigation. An unincorporated student
association and several Harvard University students ﬁled a suit against the university
and the corporation responsible for investing the university’s endowment.55 The clai-
mants argued that the respondents’ investment in fossil fuel companies would breach
their duty to apply the trust funds for the trust’s charitable purposes, including its ‘spe-
cial obligation and accountability to the future’, and sought an injunction ordering the
defendants to withdraw any direct or indirect holdings in fossil fuel companies.56 On
17March 2015, theMassachusetts Superior Court dismissed the action on the grounds
that the individual claimants lacked legal standing.57 On 6 October 2016, the
Massachusetts Appellate Court afﬁrmed the dismissal on similar grounds.58
3.3. Decision-Making Processes
In addition to the scope of their mandates, the regulation of internal decision-making
processes is another important source of potential climate litigation for public author-
ities operating in ﬁnancial markets. In at least eight out of the 46 cases identiﬁed in the
52 Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009 [2012] OJ C 326/47, available at: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.
53 For a critical analysis of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy under Art. 11 TFEU, see Solana, n. 18 above.
54 Under English law, this type of breach would give rise to different remedies, e.g., restoration of the trust
property that was removed from the trust such as by selling the shares or seeking compensation for any
loss to the trust: see I.G. MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law of Financial Investment (Hart, 2012),
p. 177. Similar issues could arise in the context of corporate law. For example, a bank’s constitution
might provide for a similar purpose. Under UK law, company directors are bound by a statutory duty
to act in accordance with the company’s constitution: Companies Act 2006, s. 171(a). I describe the
potential remedies available to a company in the event of a breach of directors’ duties in Section 3.6
below.
55 B. Franta, ‘Litigation in the Fossil Fuel DivestmentMovement’ (2017) 39(4) Law&Policy, pp. 393–411.
56 See Harvard Climate Justice Coalition and Others v. Harvard Corporation and Others, Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 19 Nov. 2014, paras 41–62, available at: http://climatecasechart.
com/case/harvard-climate-justice-coalition-v-president-fellows-of-harvard-college.
57 Harvard Climate Justice Coalition and Others v. Harvard Corporation and Others, Massachusetts
Superior Court, 17 Mar. 2015, Civil Action No. 2014-3620-H.
58 Harvard Climate Justice Coalition and Others v. Harvard Corporation and Others, Massachusetts
Appellate Court, 6 Oct. 2016, No. 15-P-905.
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
Transnational Environmental Law10
database, the claimants rely on arguments that a public authority was in breach of an
obligation that required it to take into consideration environmental protection con-
cerns when designing and/or implementing speciﬁc policies. Typically, these obliga-
tions concerned the elaboration of environmental impact assessments. In some cases,
as we shall see, the claimants also alleged a potential breach of their procedural rights
in the authority’s decision-making process.
In RBS, in addition to the human rights claims referred to above, the claimants
argued that the UK Treasury had not carried out a proper Green Book assessment
before taking the decision to provide ﬁnancial support to RBS.59 Their claim was
based on three grounds. On the ﬁrst ground, the most relevant for our purposes, the
claimants argued that the UK Treasury had ‘failed properly to evaluate arguments in
favour of a more interventionist policy for UKFI [i.e. the Treasury-owned company
used to channel ﬁnancial support to RBS] on environmental grounds and human rights
grounds, as was required by the Green Book’.60 The court dismissed this ﬁrst ground, as
it did for the remaining two. In particular, the court recognized that the UK Treasury
‘had a very wide discretion as to matters which should be taken into account or left out
of account in formulating [the RBS] policy’61 and concluded that the Treasury’s regard
for environmental and human rights considerations in the Green Book assessment was
proper.62
Importantly, however, the breadth of the UK Treasury’s discretion in RBS relied
greatly on the non-prescriptive nature of the Green Book.63 More prescriptive rules
could cast doubt on the breadth of that discretion. For example, under EU law the
aforementioned integration principle is binding on the ECB and the national central
banks (NCBs) of the EU Member States that comprise the Eurosystem, which are
responsible for the monetary policy of the eurozone.64 The Eurosystem’s failure to
take into account environmental protection objectives when designing and implement-
ing monetary policy measures in the eurozone would expose the ECB and the relevant
NCBs to litigation risk.65 In light of recent case law of the CJEU, which regards proced-
ural guarantees as a strict limit to wide political discretion, even in the context of ﬁnan-
cial crises, that litigation risk seems considerably high.66
In the US, ﬁnancial projects developed by public authorities have been the object of
judicial review on grounds of breach by these authorities of procedural obligations. In
Spinelli, for example, several US city governments and environmental groups ﬁled a
59 The Appraisal and Valuation in Central Government (the ‘Green Book’) sets out HM Treasury guidance
regarding decision making in central government: see RBS, n. 32 above, para. 8.
60 RBS, n. 32 above, para. 9. The same paragraph describes the other two grounds: regard to industry-wide
regulation to deal with environmental problems as an irrelevant consideration; and a misapplication of
s. 172 Companies Act 2006, which sets out basic corporate governance rules.
61 RBS, n. 32 above, para. 21.
62 Ibid., paras 26–30.
63 Ibid., paras 22, 25.
64 Solana, n. 18 above.
65 Ibid., n. 18 above, pp. 17–19
66 Ibid.
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lawsuit against the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the US government’s
development ﬁnance institution, and the US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), the
ofﬁcial export credit agency of the US,67 for their failure to assess carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions of the projects they support, as required under US statutory law.
68
On 23 August 2005, a federal district court recognized the claimants’ right to sue the
agencies to seek compliance.69 On 6 February 2009, the two agencies settled the
lawsuit and agreed, among other things, to consider greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
from the projects they ﬁnance and to revise their environmental policies in consultation
with representatives of the claimants.70
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. US Department of Agriculture, a federal district court
held that the US Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service should have pre-
pared an environmental impact statement concerning the use of low-interest loans to
ﬁnance the construction of new generating units at a coal-ﬁred power plant in western
Kansas.71 Later, the same court prevented the respondent from issuing any approvals
or arrangements directly related to the project until an environmental assessment had
been completed.72
There have also been less successful examples. In Ex-Im Bank, three environmental
groups challenged the authorization by Ex-Im Bank of nearly USD 4.8 billion in ﬁnan-
cing for two liquid natural gas projects near the Great Barrier Reef in Australia on
grounds that Ex-Im Bank had violated the claimants’ procedural rights under federal
legislation.73 In particular, the claimants alleged that, before approving the loans for
each of the projects, Ex-Im Bank did not engage in a statutory consultation and that
its review of the environmental impact of the two projects did not satisfy its statutory
duty to take into account the impacts of the projects on the Great Barrier Reef World
Heritage Area.74 On 31 March 2016, the district court dismissed the claims on the
ground of the claimants’ lack of standing. In particular, the district court found that
the claimants had failed to establish redressability, necessary for standing, because
they had not offered a sufﬁcient basis to determine that therewas a reasonable probabil-
ity that the two projects would be halted if the Ex-Im Bank’s funding was withdrawn.75
On 28 June 2018, the US Court of Appeals conﬁrmed the decision of the district court,
emphasizing two additional points: ﬁrstly, in the absence of the funding contracts from
67 Center for Biological Diversity and Others v. Export-Import Bank of the US and Others, US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 16-15946, 28 June 2018 (Ex-Im Bank), pp. 4–5.
68 See alsoMississippi Insurance Department v.USDepartment of Homeland Security andOthers, Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Complaint, 26 Sept. 2013, 1:13-cv-379-LG-JMR
(Mississippi Insurance Department).
69 Friends of the Earth, Inc. and Others v. Peter Watson and Phillip Merrill, US Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California, 23 Aug. 2005, No. C 02-4 106 JSW.
70 For details see http://climatecasechart.com/case/friends-of-the-earth-v-watson.
71 Sierra Club v.US Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service, US District Court for the District of
Columbia, Order, 29 Mar. 2011, Case 1:07-cv-01860-EGS.
72 Sierra Club v.USDepartment of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service, ibid., Memorandum of Opinion, 31
Jan. 2012.
73 Ex-Im Bank, n 67 above.
74 Ibid., p. 7.
75 Ibid., p. 8.
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Transnational Environmental Law12
the record, it was very difﬁcult for the claimants to provide evidence of the action that
Ex-Im Bank could take to alter the course of the projects if the statutory procedures
were to reveal a negative environmental impact;76 and, secondly, given the relatively
small ﬁnancial contribution to the project, other lenders could have stepped in to
replace Ex-Im Bank’s ﬁnance were it to withdraw from the project.77 It is interesting
to note that, in 2015, a federal district court had already dismissed a similar claim in
relation to Ex-Im Bank’s provision of a USD 90 million loan guarantee to support
the export of coal from Appalachian coal mines on similar grounds.78
Environmental concerns might also be relevant in the evaluation of a public author-
ity’s compliance with obligations to produce ﬁnancial assessments. For example, in
EFIC, Environmental Justice Australia, an environmental law non-governmental
organization (NGO), ﬁled a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman request-
ing an ofﬁcial investigation into the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC),
Australia’s export credit agency, and its failure to publish its Board’s assessment of a
proposal related to the Adani Carmichael mine and rail project.79 According to the
complainants, EFIC is required by law to provide the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade with an assessment of the transaction’s compliance with a list of criteria,
including the ﬁnancial viability of the project.80 In the complainants’ opinion,
‘[EFIC’s] directors are guided by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA), and are unlikely to ﬁnance Adani-related loans due to their requirement to
take into account APRA’s comments on 1.5–2°C base case global warming scen-
arios’.81 The Board’s ﬁnancial assessment has an instrumental value: if the Board did
take into consideration the effects of the climate crisis when deciding to ﬁnance the
Adani-related project, these considerations must have been included in the assess-
ment.82 As of 31December 2018, the CommonwealthOmbudsmanwas still investigat-
ing Environmental Justice Australia’s complaint.
76 Ibid., p. 16. The court also relied on the absence of the funding contracts from the record to dismiss the
respondents’ arguments that the claims were moot because the projects had been completed, the loans
disbursed, and one of them fully repaid, therefore leaving Ex-Im Bank no channel to affect the environ-
mental impact of the project: ibid., p. 10.
77 Ibid., p. 17.
78 Chesapeake Climate Action Network v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, US District Court for
the District of Columbia, Memorandum Opinion, 21 Jan. 2015, 13-1820 (RC).
79 Complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman presented by Environmental Justice Australia, 6 July
2018: Environmental Justice Australia, ‘EJA Files Complaint with Ombudsman about EFIC’, available
at: https://www.envirojustice.org.au/projects/eja-ﬁles-complaint-with-ombudsman-about-eﬁc.
80 Letter from Environmental Justice Australia to EFIC, 13 June 2018: Environmental Justice Australia,
ibid.
81 Environmental Justice Australia, ‘The Real Risks of EFIC Support for Adani’, 6 June 2018, available at:
https://www.envirojustice.org.au/projects/eja-ﬁles-complaint-with-ombudsman-about-eﬁc. Environmental
Justice Australia had made a similar, yet more elaborate, argument in relation to the ﬁnancing by
Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility of a railway project tied to the exploitation of a coal mine: see
Environmental Justice Australia, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 28 July
2017, paras 9–33, available at: https://www.envirojustice.org.au/our-work/climate/climate-and-ﬁnance/
adani-naif-and-eﬁc.
82 The Commonwealth Ombudsman has the power to compel EFIC to disclose internal documents, such as
the Board’s assessment: see Environmental Justice Australia, n. 79 above.
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While the majority of recorded cases in this category are ‘pro-regulatory’, there is at
least one ‘anti-regulatory’ case, which suggests that the decision-making processes of
public authorities may be an additional litigation front for market participants inter-
ested in forestalling the impact of sustainable ﬁnance initiatives.83 In Institute for
Energy Research, a non-proﬁt public policy institute ﬁled a Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against the US
Department of the Treasury.84 The claimant is seeking to compel the US Treasury to
respond to an earlier request to disclose internal correspondence in relation to the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).85
Institute for Energy Research also evidences that formal access to information
requests may have an instrumental value in the preparation of cases in this category
as potential claimants seek to gain an insight into the decision-making processes of
public authorities. A refusal to furnish the information requested in itself could give
rise to litigation. In these cases, claimants will need to persuade the court or the com-
petent administrative body that the information requested falls within the scope of the
relevant statute recognizing the right to access information. Information that is ﬁnan-
cial in nature may lead to more scrupulous examination.86
All of these cases concern alleged violations of procedural obligations by public
authorities.87 Nevertheless, there are some countries where private ﬁnancial institu-
tions are required by law to incorporate environmental due diligence into their credit
risk assessments. For example, in a recent case, Chinese ﬁnancial supervisory author-
ities imposed a ﬁne on Ping An Bank for its failure to conduct pre-loan investigations
in relation to its customers’ compliance with environmental standards.88 Banks, as
83 Another evident litigation front is public authority mandates: see Section 3.2 above.
84 Institute for Energy Research v. US Department of the Treasury, US District Court for the District of
Columbia, Complaint, 17 Jul. 2018, C.A. No. 18-1677 (Institute for Energy Research).
85 N. 12 above.
86 E.g., Art. 2.3 of the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998,
in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: https://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html) does not seem to
regard ﬁnancial data as ‘environmental information’. In Friends of the Earth Germany, two environmen-
tal NGOs challenged the refusal by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour (BMWA) to
provide them with certain environmentally sensitive information relating to export credit support
and/or guarantees provided by BMWA. The Berlin Administrative Court examined whether the infor-
mation requested by the claimants fell within the scope of the German Access to Environmental
Information Act of 2003 as amended, and proposed a settlement to the parties detailing the elements
that BMWA would have to disclose: Bundes fur Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. &
Germanwatch e.V. v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vertreten durch Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft
und Arbeit, Verwaltungsgericht Belin, 10 Jan. 2006, VG 10 A 215.04 (Friends of the Earth
Germany). An unofﬁcial translation of the German original is available at: http://climatecasechart.
com/non-us-case/german-federation-for-environment-and-conservation-bund-ev-v-minister-for-
commerce-and-labor-on-behalf-of-federal-republic-of-germany.
87 In addition to the public authorities in the jurisdictionsmentioned above, most multilateral ﬁnancial insti-
tutions engage in environmental impact assessment: see W.V. Kennedy, ‘EIA and Multi-lateral Financial
Institutions’, conference paper presented at OECD Conference on FDI and the Environment, The Hague
(The Netherlands), 28–29 Jan. 1999, available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelop-
ment/2076277.pdf.
88 See W.X. Ming, ‘The Banking Regulatory Bureau Imposed Penalties for the First Time on the Basis
of Green Credit Guidelines: How Should the Banking Industry Respond to the New Requirements
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Transnational Environmental Law14
suppliers of ﬁnancial resources that enable companies to develop new projects, are well
placed to complement the monitoring efforts of supervisory authorities. As political
momentum to promote sustainable ﬁnance grows, we can expect regulators in other
countries to impose similar gatekeeping obligations on banks to buttress the implemen-
tation of sustainable ﬁnance policies. Such regulatory measures would increase compli-
ance costs for banks, sowe can reasonably expect some opposition from the industry. In
some countries such opposition might be channelled through litigation.
3.4. Disclosure
The disclosure of climate-related information to investors underpins a high proportion
of the 46 cases found in the database search. This type of claim is divided into two sub-
categories: (i) primary market disclosure obligations, and (ii) secondary market disclos-
ure obligations.
Primary market disclosure obligations
Securities regulation in many jurisdictions requires companies that seek to raise ﬁnance
by issuing securities in capital markets, or whowant to have securities admitted to trad-
ing in regulated markets, to produce a legal document giving detailed information
about the company (such as its main line of business, its ﬁnances and shareholding
structure) and the securities being issued. This legal document is often referred to as
a ‘prospectus’.89 The main rationale for requiring issuers to disclose speciﬁc informa-
tion in these cases is to protect investors from fraud and other malpractices associated
with the issuing and trading of securities, and to facilitate assessment by investors of the
risks associated with purchasing securities.90
In May 2014, Chesapeake Climate Action Network (CCAN), an environmental
group, and Ruth McElroy Amundsen, a shareholder of US natural gas company
Dominion Resources, Inc., ﬁled a complaint with the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) urging the latter to require Dominion Midstream Partners LP to
update the registration statement it had ﬁled with the SEC on 28 March 2014 to
include, among other things, adequate information relating to environmental risk
and impact, particularly the potential physical impacts of climate change on a liquefac-
tion project.91 The complainants argued that the disclosure that Dominion hadmade in
its registration statement was too vague to meet the risk disclosure criteria required
under the SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change.92 As of
31 December 2018, the SEC was yet to publish a decision on the matter.
for Green Credit?’, Blue Map, 12 July 2018, available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
T8VcbIZFIVMv40AAodnRSA.
89 See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 on the Prospectus to be Publishedwhen Securities AreOffered to the
Public or Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market [2017] OJ L 168/12 (Prospectus Regulation).
90 See Armour et al., n. 21 above, pp. 62–4.
91 See Letter, CCAN andRuthMcElroy Amundsen to the SEC in the matter of DominionMidstream Partners
LP Registration Statement, 6 May 2014, available at: http://climatecasechart.com/case/letter-to-securities-
and-exchange-commission-regarding-dominion-midstream-partners-lp-registration-statement.
92 For details see ibid., pp. 6–7.
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In May 2017, Greenpeace Canada, an environmental NGO, requested the Alberta
Securities Commission to halt the initial public offering (IPO) of Kinder Morgan of
its Canadian business alleging, among other things, incomplete disclosure of
climate-related risks in the IPO prospectus.93 After the Alberta securities regulator
agreed to review Greenpeace Canada’s request, Kinder Morgan amended its
prospectus.94
The successful challenge to Kinder Morgan’s IPO prospectus might lead to similar
challenges against companies seeking to issue or trade securities in regulated markets
the business activities of which contribute to aggravating the climate crisis. These com-
panies will need to ensure that their prospectuses provide sufﬁcient information on
climate-related risks; otherwise, insufﬁcient disclosure might lead to the suspension
of the IPO.
The development of new taxonomies for green ﬁnancial products95 may also impose
additional disclosure obligations on ﬁnancial market participants. Companies seeking
to use these taxonomies when advertising their securities may have to disclose speciﬁc
elements to assure potential investors that the products fall within a certain ‘green’
category. Besides increasing the costs of issuing and trading securities, these disclosures
might expose ﬁnancial market participants to an increased risk of litigation. For
example, investors might claim that an issuer misrepresented information which they
relied on to make an investment decision and might litigate to seek compensation for
loss.96 Moreover, public authorities may initiate investigations against issuers and sel-
lers of ‘green’ ﬁnancial products to protect consumers and promote fair competition.
For example, between 2008 and 2010 the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission initiated legal action against six companies the business conduct of
which it had previously investigated in relation to ‘false green advertising’ (i.e., making
misleading claims to potential customers about the environmental beneﬁts of products
and services being sold). When the companies were unable to substantiate the environ-
mental beneﬁts they had claimed, they agreed to compensate affected customers, and
committed to publish a corrective notice and halt its false advertising.97 As issuers
and ﬁnancial services providers begin to rely on ‘green’ taxonomies, they too will be
exposed to the risk of public authorities initiating these types of investigation.
93 See Letter from 20 NGOs to the 14 banks that underwrote the Kinder Morgan Canada IPO and the 14
other banks involved in current and past KinderMorgan revolving credit facilities, 6 June 2017, available
at: http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/ﬁnal_trans_mountain_letter_june_2017.pdf. Kinder Morgan
is one of the largest energy infrastructure companies in North America, with its headquarters in Houston,
TX (US).
94 Ibid.
95 See, e.g., EC Sustainable Finance Action Plan, n. 5 above.
96 As we shall see in the next subsection, there are precedents of investors suing issuers for loss compensation
on grounds that the latter misrepresented information in their statutory reports.
97 See, for all, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Goodyear Tyres Apologises, Offers
Compensation for Unsubstantiated Environmental Claims’, 26 June 2008, available at: http://climatecase-
chart.com/non-us-case/australian-competition-and-consumer-commission-v-goodyear-tyres.
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Secondary market disclosure obligations
Inadequate disclosure of climate-related risks in relation to the statutory reporting obli-
gations of companies has given rise to many cases. In the US, the Ofﬁce of the Attorney
General (AGO) of the State of New York has been particularly active in scrutinizing
companies’ reporting to ﬁnancial supervisors, mainly the SEC. To date, there are ﬁve
reported cases in which the New York AGO has required corporations, including
Exxon Mobil, to provide the AGO with information regarding analyses by these com-
panies of their climate risks and their disclosures of such risks in SEC reports.98 The
Massachusetts AGO and the US Virgin Islands AGO have issued similar civil investiga-
tive demands to Exxon Mobil.99
At the time of writing, in three out of these six investigations the corporations have
reached a settlement with the New York AGO in which they have agreed to begin or to
continue to disclose, as applicable, in their periodic reports to the SEC several elements
concerning climate-related risks. These include (i) an analysis of ﬁnancial risks arising
from regulations of GHG emissions in relation to climate change; (ii) an analysis of
ﬁnancial risks arising from climate litigation involving the company or otherwise;
(iii) an analysis of ﬁnancial risks from the physical impacts of climate change; and
(iv) a strategic analysis of climate risk and emissions management.100
Some of the investigations that remain open have led to litigation against these com-
panies on grounds that they had fraudulently misrepresented information about them-
selves or the securities they were issuing. For example, on 24October 2018, building on
the investigation that it had begun in 2015,101 the New York AGO ﬁled a fraud action
against Exxon for alleged misrepresentations in climate disclosure.102 The AGO has
relied on similar claims to those presented in Ramirez, in which an Exxon investor
98 Letter from New York AGO to the Chairman of Dominion Resources, Inc., 14 Sept. 2007, available
at: http://climatecasechart.com/case/in-re-dominion-resources-inc (In Re Dominion Resources);
Assurance of Discontinuance in the Matter of Dynegy Inc., AOD #08-132, 23 Oct. 2008, available
at: http://climatecasechart.com/case/in-re-dynegy-inc (In re Dynegy); Assurance of Discontinuance
in the Matter of The AES Corp., AOD # 09-15, 19 Nov. 2009, available at: http://climatecasechart.
com/case/in-re-aes-corp (In re AES); Assurance of Discontinuance in the Matter of Peabody Energy
Corp., AOD # 15-242, 8 Nov. 2015, available at: http://climatecasechart.com/case/in-re-peabody-
energy-corp (In re Peabody); Letter from New York AGO to S. Jack Balagia Jr., Vice-President and
General Counsel of Exxon Mobil Corporation, 4 Nov. 2015, available at: http://climatecasechart.
com/case/new-york-attorney-general-investigation-of-exxonmobil (In re Exxon Mobil (NY)).
99 See Letter from Massachusetts AGO to Exxon Mobil Corp., 2016-EPD-36, 19 Apr. 2016 (In re Exxon
Mobil (MA)). See also US Virgin Islands Ofﬁce of the Attorney General v. Exxon Mobil Corporation,
4 Apr. 2016, Case No. 2016 CA 002469. Both documents are available at: http://climatecasechart.
com/case/in-re-civil-investigative-demand-no-2016-epd-36.
100 See In re Dynegy, n. 98 above; In re AES, n. 98 above. In In re Peabody (n. 98 above) the company agreed
to disclose similar information in its regular reports to the SEC and to avoid disclosing information to
‘shareholders, the ﬁnancial industry, investors, the general public and others’ that is inconsistent with cer-
tain guidelines regarding the company’s projections of the impact of climate change on its business.
101 See In re Exxon Mobil (NY), n. 98 above. Similar fraud investigations have been launched by the
Massachusetts AGO and the US Virgin Islands AGO. See In re Exxon Mobil (MA), n. 99 above;
US Virgin Islands Ofﬁce of the Attorney General v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 4 Apr. 2016, Case
No. 2016 CA 002469.
102 See People of the State of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, Supreme Court of the State of
New York, 28 Oct. 2018, No. 452044/2018.
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ﬁled a securities fraud class action against Exxon Mobil and three Exxon ofﬁcers
alleging that, between 19 February 2016 and 27 October 2016, the company’s reports
were materially false and misleading because they had not disclosed relevant
climate-related risks, some of which had been identiﬁed in the company’s internal
reports. The suit, ﬁled on 7 November 2016,103 followed Exxon’s publication of its
third quarter ﬁnancial results on 28 October 2016, in which the company disclosed
that it might have to write down 20% of its oil and gas assets, which led to the com-
pany’s stock price falling by more than USD 2 per share. The claimant has requested
the court to award compensatory damages against all defendants, jointly and severally,
for all loss sustained as a result of their wrongdoing. On 14 August 2018, the US
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas allowed the suit to proceed.104
The court conﬁrmed its decision in an order on 5November 2018 after the respondents
ﬁled a motion for reconsideration.105
In Canada, the successful challenge to KinderMorgan’s IPO prospectus led the com-
pany to amend the prospectus in 2017 to include certain information about
climate-related risks. A year later, these climate-related risks were carried over into
the company’s 2017 annual report, one of the documents that the company is required
to ﬁle with the SEC.106 On 27 March 2018, Greenpeace Canada ﬁled a complaint
before the Ontario Securities Commission, alleging that the company had disclosed
insufﬁcient information about its climate-related risks in the 2017 annual report.107
The complaint is based on the recommendations presented by the TCFD,108 a private
sector initiative coordinated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international
body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global ﬁnancial system.109
In particular, the complainants argue that the company’s 2017 annual report does not
include information about climate-related legal risks, such as the risk that some of its
customers face as a result of pending climate litigation cases and fraud investigations
against them related to climate change, and it does not disclose the resilience of the com-
pany’s business in a low-carbon scenario, as the TCFD recommends.110 The Ontario
Securities Commission passed on the complaint to the Alberta Securities Commission,
103 On 26 July 2017, the claimwas expanded to include additional investors who had acquired Exxon’s pub-
licly traded common stock between 31 Mar. 2014 and 30 Jan. 2017: Pedro Ramirez, Jr. and Others
v. Exxon Mobil and Others, US District Court of the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
Complaint, 7 Nov. 2016, Case No. 3:16-cv-3111.
104 See Pedro Ramirez, Jr. andOthers v. ExxonMobil andOthers, ibid., Opinion and Order, 14 Aug. 2018,
Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-3111-K.
105 Ibid.
106 Greenpeace Canada, ‘Investor Beware: Kinder Morgan Canada’s Climate Risk’, 9 Apr. 2018, available
at: https://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/publication/1290/investor-beware-kinder-morgan-canadas-
climate-risk.
107 Greenpeace Canada, ‘Alberta Securities Commission Reviewing Greenpeace Complaint of Inadequate
Disclosure of Climate Risk by Kinder Morgan’, 9 Apr. 2018, available at: https://www.greenpeace.
org/canada/en/press-release/285/press-release-alberta-securities-commission-reviewing-greenpeace-
complaint-of-inadequate-disclosure-of-climate-risk-by-kinder-morgan.
108 TCFD, n. 12 above.
109 For more information about the TCFD, see https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about. For more information about
the FSB, see http://www.fsb.org/about.
110 Greenpeace Canada, n. 106 above, pp. 6–9; see also TCFD, n. 12 above, pp. 5, 25–31.
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the principal regulator for Kinder Morgan. On 6 April 2018, the Alberta Securities
Commission notiﬁed Greenpeace Canada that it would review the complaint.111
Similar cases have arisen in other jurisdictions. In 2017, two shareholders of
Commonwealth Bank of Australia challenged several of the bank’s 2016 annual
reports,112 alleging that the bank had failed to disclose climate-related risks. In particu-
lar, the claimants argued that, by failing to disclose speciﬁc aspects of its climate-related
risks, the bank had failed to give a true and fair view of its ﬁnancial position and per-
formance and had prevented its members from making an informed assessment of the
bank’s operations and future prospects, in violation of the 2001 Corporations Act.113
The claimants sought a declaration that the bank had contravened the 2001
Corporations Act by failing to disclose climate-related risks and an injunction requiring
the bank to report on those risks.114 The claimants discontinued proceedings a few
weeks later, after the bank’s 2017 annual report included, for the ﬁrst time, an
acknowledgement from the bank’s directors that ‘climate change posed a signiﬁcant
risk to the bank’s operations, with a promise to undertake climate change scenario
analysis on its business in the upcoming year to assess the risk’.115 In other cases, share-
holders have used requisitions to encourage banks to disclose climate-related ﬁnancial
information and when directors have tried to block, or have failed to respond to, these
requisitions, shareholders have ﬁled complaints before ﬁnancial supervisory authorities
or ordinary courts seeking the removal of any obstacles.116
In the UK, ClientEarth, an environmental law NGO, recently ﬁled three complaints
before the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) against three insurance ﬁrms on grounds
111 Greenpeace Canada, n. 107 above.
112 These included the Annual Report, Directors’Annual Report and Financial Report for the 2016 ﬁnancial
year.
113 Guy Abrahams (and Another) v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Federal Court of Australia, General
Division, Victoria District Court Registry, Concise Statement ﬁled on 7 Aug. 2017, paras 16–19, avail-
able at: https://www.envirojustice.org.au/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/170807%20Concise%20Statement%20
(as%20ﬁled).pdf (Abrahams).
114 Ibid., para. 20.
115 G. Hutchens, ‘Commonwealth Bank Shareholders Drop Suit over Nondisclosure of Climate Risks’,
The Guardian, 21 Sept. 2017, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/sep/21/
commonwealth-bank-shareholders-drop-suit-over-non-disclosure-of-climate-risks.
116 InACCR, e.g., a bank published its notice of meeting for the annual general meeting but failed to include
the vote on several resolutions advanced by a group of shareholders, who proposed that the bank disclose
certain climate-related information. The shareholders ﬁled a suit before the Federal Court of Australia
seeking an injunction that the bank ensured that the ﬁrst two resolutions be considered or moved at its
next annual general meeting. The ﬁrst instance court dismissed the shareholders’ claims and concluded
that the proposed resolutions fell within the power of management, which the bank’s constitution vested
exclusively in the board: Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v. Commonwealth Bank of
Australia, Federal Court of Australia, General Division, Victoria District Court Registry, 31 July 2015,
[2015] FCA 785 (ACCR), paras 16–40. The Federal Court of Australia conﬁrmed the primary judge’s
decision: Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia,
Federal Court of Australia, 10 June 2016, 248 FCR 280 (2016). In the US, similar complaints have
been ﬁled before the SEC but, as of 31 Dec. 2018, none involved ﬁnancial market participants. There
are several examples of boards of directors that have supported shareholder resolutions seeking to
enhance transparency on climate risks: see, e.g., A. Raval & O. Walker, ‘BP Agrees to Greater Climate
Disclosure’, Financial Times, 1 Feb. 2019, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/60638ece-25b0-
11e9-8ce6-5db4543da632. Despite cases likeACCR, the example of BP suggests that shareholder resolu-
tions may be an effective mechanism to inﬂuence boards’ decision-making processes.
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that they had failed to disclose climate-related risks adequately in their annual reports,
which could hamper the ability of investors to make an informed assessment about the
future prospect of the companies.117 In particular, ClientEarth contends that
climate-related risks fall within the category of ‘principal risks’ – as referred to in the
UK’s Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules (DTR),118 which implement the
EU Transparency Directive119 – because they can be interpreted as material informa-
tion, as deﬁned in the 2014 Guidance on the Strategic Report published by the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC).120 ClientEarth is requesting the FCA to impose
a ﬁnancial penalty on these ﬁrms in an amount that it considers appropriate and to
require them to publish information so as to rectify the deﬁciencies in their annual
reports, or, in the alternative, to publish a statement censuring these ﬁrms.121
Building on similar arguments, at the beginning of September 2018, ClientEarth
ﬁled four complaints before the FRC, alleging that four companies with a premium list-
ing on the London Stock Exchange had failed to disclose adequate information about
climate-related risks in their annual reports.122 By failing to do so, these companies are
allegedly in breach of DTR provisions that require all issuers to disclose all ‘principal
risks’, as described above, and to ‘take all reasonable care to ensure that any informa-
tion [they] notif[y] to a [FCA-approved primary information provider] is not mislead-
ing, false or deceptive and does not omit anything likely to affect the import of the
information’.123 In relation to the alleged breaches of DTR provisions, ClientEarth
has requested that the FCR Conduct Committee appoint a review group to consider
these matters and/or to refer them to the FCA.124
All the climate cases referred to in this subsection are based on existing securities
laws and regulations that have a general scope of application.125 Nevertheless,
117 All complaints are available at: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-info/fca-com-
plaint-lancashire-holdings-limited.
118 FCA Handbook, DTR 4.1.8 R, available at: https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR.
119 Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in relation to Information
about Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC [2004] OJ L 390/38 (as amended) (Transparency Directive).
120 For all, see ClientEarth, ‘Complaint to the FCA: Lancashire Holdings Limited’, 2 Aug. 2018, paras 143–
50, available at: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-info/fca-complaint-lanca-
shire-holdings-limited
121 For all, see ibid., paras 166, 168.
122 All complaints are available at: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-category/com-
pany-reporting.
123 FCAHandbook, n. 118 above, DTR1A.3.2R. FCA-approved primary information providers act as regu-
latory information services and disseminate regulatory announcements required by the Listing Rules and
DTR on behalf of listed companies by passing the announcements to news vendors (i.e., secondary infor-
mation providers). See Art. 89P Financial Services andMarkets Act 2000. In addition to a breach of spe-
ciﬁc reporting requirements for listed companies under the DTR, the complaints further alleged that the
failure of these four companies to disclose climate-related information in their annual reports had
breached speciﬁc provisions of the 2006 Companies Act and the Listing Rules. For all, see ClientEarth,
‘Complaint to the FRC Conduct Committee: Bodycote PLC’, 7 Sept. 2018, paras 73–111, available at:
https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-category/company-reporting.
124 For all, see ibid., para. 116.
125 In certain cases, regulators have published formal guidance regarding existing disclosure requirements as
they apply to climate change: see, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Commission
Guidance regarding Disclosure related to Climate Change’, 8 Feb. 2010, available at: https://www.sec.
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Transnational Environmental Law20
legislators have started to adopt more speciﬁc legislation requiring companies to dis-
close climate-related ﬁnancial risks. For example, on 11 September 2018, the
Department of Work and Pensions presented a set of investment regulations before
the UK Parliament that will require trustees to update their statement of investment
principles by October 2019 ‘with a policy on how they take account of ﬁnancially
material [Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)] considerations, including spe-
ciﬁcally climate change, “over the appropriate time horizon of the investments”’.126
Similarly, in California, new legislation will require two large public pension funds
to report publicly on the climate-related ﬁnancial risks in their portfolios, beginning
in 2020.127 As this new legislation comes into force and other jurisdictions begin to
adopt similar initiatives, the risk of litigation on grounds of inadequate climate-related
ﬁnancial disclosure will increase.
3.5. Breach of Contract
The development of markets for green ﬁnancial products such as ‘green bonds’ or
‘green loans’ will inevitably lead to litigation related to the performance of contractual
obligations. For example, one of the elements that typically deﬁnes green ﬁnancial
products is the environmental impact of the project for which ﬁnance is being raised.
In the Green Bond Principles (GBP), published by the International Capital Markets
Association (ICMA) in June 2018, the use of proceeds is described as an essential fea-
ture of these products: ‘Green Bonds are any type of bond instrument where the pro-
ceeds will be exclusively applied to ﬁnance or re-ﬁnance, in part or in full, new and/
or existing eligible Green Projects (see section 1 Use of Proceeds) and which are aligned
with the four core components of the GBP’.128 In addition, according to Section 1 of the
Principles:
The cornerstone of a Green Bond is the utilisation of the proceeds of the bond for Green
Projects, which should be appropriately described in the legal documentation for the secur-
ity. All designated Green Projects should provide clear environmental beneﬁts, which will
be assessed and, where feasible, quantiﬁed by the issuer.129
Investors interested in purchasing green bonds may be very concerned with the secur-
ities retaining that classiﬁcation.130 Concerns with issuers raising funds through green
gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf; Canadian Securities Administrators, ‘CSA Staff Notice 51-333
Environmental Reporting Guidance’, 27 Oct. 2010, available at: https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/
en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-reporting.pdf.
126 See Rust, n. 9 above.
127 See Thompson, n. 9 above.
128 See ICMA, Green Bond Principles, June 2018, p. 3 (emphasis added). The Green Loan Principles (GLP)
published by the LoanMarket Association (LMA) include a very similar deﬁnition which emphasizes the
need for green loans to ‘exclusively… ﬁnance or re-ﬁnance, in whole or in part, new and/or existing eli-
gible Green Projects’: LMA, Green Loan Principles, 21 Mar. 2018, p. 2 (emphasis added).
129 ICMA, ibid., p. 3. See also LMA, ibid., p. 2.
130 E.g., investment funds seeking to commercialize green portfolios among their customers will be keen to
guarantee that all the assets in that portfolio meet certain standards, including compliance with the GBP,
lest those customers initiate legal proceedings for misrepresenting information: see Section 3.4 above.
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ﬁnancial products to ﬁnance non-environmentally friendly projects do exist among
investors.131 In order to address these concerns, green bond and green loan contracts
might include provisions that require the issuer or borrower to guarantee that the
ﬁnance raised will be used only to fund speciﬁc projects and/or to guarantee that it
will not be used to ﬁnance certain others.132 A breach of these contractual obligations
could lead investors and lenders to enforce early termination rights that would trigger
an acceleration of payments. Investors and lenders might also seek compensation for
any loss or damage that might arise as a result of the contractual breach.
Even if the funds raised through green bonds or green loans are being used exclu-
sively to (re)ﬁnance eligible green projects, investors and lenders could still seek com-
pensation for loss or damage that result from the failure of the issuer or borrower to
meet the environmental sustainability objectives communicated to investors and
lenders.133 Investment funds that advertise green portfolios might fear the risk of litiga-
tion from their own investors, who might seek compensation for loss resulting from the
misrepresentation of the environmental impact of the portfolio.
Moreover, banksmay also have an incentive to conduct environmental due diligence
of the projects they ﬁnance.134 Theymay require borrowers to represent in the loan con-
tract that all the environmental information they furnish the bank with is true and
accurate. This environmental information can include not only environmental permits
and licences relevant to the development of the project, but also documents evidencing
internal risk management policies and operational policies. A breach of these represen-
tations could give rise to the early termination of the ﬁnance contract and could poten-
tially lead to litigation against the borrower for repayment of any amounts due under
the contract and for compensation for any potential loss resulting from the breach.
Cutting across these and other potential contractual claims is the problem of con-
tractual interpretation. For example, some terms used in the GBP to deﬁne the scope
of eligible Green Projects, such as ‘biodiversity conservation’ or ‘circular economy’,
are purposefully vague.135Moreover, the parties might disagree as to the process neces-
sary to appoint an external reviewer to conﬁrm the alignment of the bond or bond pro-
gramme with the four core components of the GBP.136
131 See, e.g., K. Allen& J. Shotter, ‘Environmental Qualms Cloud Poland’s Green Bond Sale’, Financial Times,
6 Feb. 2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/634b4fe8-074b-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.
132 E.g., the Final Terms of a EUR 300 million bond issue by a Polish energy company, Energa, in 2017
included an express restriction on the use of proceeds: ‘Proceeds will be used for funding distribution
capex and for general corporate purposes. This facility will not be used for new power generation pro-
jects’ (emphasis added). The Final Terms are available at: https://www.bourse.lu/security/
XS1575640054/248345.
133 These objectives are identiﬁed as one of the elements that issuers and borrowers should communicate to
investors and lenders, respectively, as part of the Process for Project Evaluation and Selection: see ICMA,
n. 128 above, p. 4; LMA, n. 128 above, p. 2.
134 In recent years, there have been several initiatives that aim to promote sustainable banking practices, e.g.,
the Equator Principles, which focus on Project ﬁnance, and the Principles for Responsible Banking, which
have a more general application. Financial institutions subscribe voluntarily to these sets of principles. In
order to comply with them, banks may be required to engage in environmental due diligence exercises.
135 See ICMA, n. 128 above, p. 4.
136 See ibid., p. 6; see also, LMA, n. 128 above, p. 3.
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Interpretation problems will be central to disputes arising from insurance contracts.
Steadfast Insurance constitutes a prominent example. In this case, an insurance com-
pany disputed the claim raised by an energy company for indemniﬁcation in underlying
litigation where the latter had been ordered to pay damages relating to a changing cli-
mate. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the insurance company
had no duty to defend or indemnify the energy company.137 If physical risks lead to
an increase in the number of claims from policyholders where the effects of climate
change damage insured property, or to an increase in the number of claims under liabil-
ity policies,138 the probability that insurance companies will be involved in this type of
litigation will increase. We can expect the insurance industry to react to this risk by nar-
rowing the coverage of insurance policies.139
3.6. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
The ﬁduciary duties of directors and trustees of ﬁnancial institutions has been at the
centre of the policy debate about the potential contribution of private ﬁnance to the
development of projects and technologies that aim to mitigate or adapt to the effects
of climate change. In general terms, there seem to be two contrary positions. One pos-
ition is that the ﬁduciary duties of fund trustees to protect the best interests of members
translates into the need to give preference to ﬁnancial returns over other environmental,
social and ethical considerations. This argument relies on narrow legal interpretations
that assimilate members’ best interests with ﬁnancial interests,140 and on a poor under-
standing of the connection between climate change and ﬁnancial returns.141 It also
seems to rely on the assumption that socially and environmentally responsible invest-
ments have a lower rate of return than investments that do not take those factors
into consideration. A growing body of empirical evidence, however, counters this
assumption.142
Others argue that investment decisions that disregard environmental and social fac-
tors may actually undermine the ﬁnancial returns of the fund, particularly in the long
137 The AES Corporation v. Steadfast Insurance Company, Virginia Supreme Court, Record No. 100764,
20 Apr. 2012 (Steadfast Insurance).
138 Ibid., paras 21, 78. For an overview of the types of claim that policyholders might raise in relation to fail-
ure to mitigate or to adapt to the impacts of climate change, see ibid., paras 63–74.
139 See J. Reeves & J.M. Umbert, ‘Climate Change and Insurance: Litigation Risks for Insurers’, Insurance
Law360, 23 Jan. 2019, available at https://www.zelle.com/news-publications-626.html.
140 For an analysis of the primacy of beneﬁciary interests in the duty of loyalty under US and UK law,
see C. Woods, ‘Funding Climate Change: How Pension Fund Fiduciary Duty Masks Trustee Inertia
and Short-Termism’, Oxford University Research Archive Working Paper, 2009, available at:
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f8296faa-6757-4246-a8e7-c9894fe01fec. See also Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus
Deringer, ‘A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into
Institutional Investment’, Oct. 2005, available at: http://www.unepﬁ.org/ﬁleadmin/documents/freshﬁeld-
s_legal_resp_20051123.pdf.
141 See J. Solomon, ‘Pension Fund Trustees and Climate Change’ (2009) ACCA Research Report No. 106,
p. 22, available at: https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/climate-
change/rr-106-001.pdf.
142 See, e.g., R. Nash, ‘Why Investors Should Act in Response to Climate-Related Risks and Opportunities:
A Survey of Current Evidence’, report prepared for ClientEarth, Aug. 2018, available at: https://www.cli-
entearth.org/top-uk-pension-funds-put-on-notice-over-climate-risk.
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term.143 Indeed, bywayof example, there seems to be a general consensus among ﬁnan-
cial regulators and supervisory authorities worldwide about the stability risks facing
the ﬁnancial system as a result of countries transitioning to low-carbon economic mod-
els.144 In short, the proﬁtability of carbon assets will drop progressively as demand for
low-carbon technologies grows. Moreover, according to Barker and her co-authors,
traditional legal defences that aim to protect the discretion of business people when
making commercial decisions, such as the ‘business judgment rule’ in common law jur-
isdictions, would not be available to pension fund trustees in this context because these
defences tend to protect governance failures of a substantive nature, whereas adequate
consideration of climate-related risks when making investment decisions is a proced-
ural failure.145 In this vein, early reports had already concluded that ‘integrating
ESG considerations into an investment analysis so as to more reliably predict ﬁnancial
performance is clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions’.146
Both positions are closer than they seem: each operates ﬁrmly on the understanding
that members’ best interests are primarily their ﬁnancial interests. This basic similarity,
however, underpins an important difference between them: the time horizon for each
position. The second perspective reﬂects the view that short-term proﬁtability does
not guarantee long-term proﬁtability, particularly in relation to climate change.147
The time horizon of investment activities may thus be more relevant to evaluate the
potential discharge of ﬁduciary duties.
Before examining ﬁduciary duties in further detail, a word of caution is necessary.
The term ‘ﬁduciary duty’ applies in a wide variety of contexts and is therefore very
elusive,148 especially when one approaches ﬁduciary duties from a transnational per-
spective. Examining the duty of reasonable care and skill from this perspective is par-
ticularly challenging. Courts in the US, for example, seem to describe it as a ﬁduciary
duty, whereas English courts make a clear distinction between these two categories.149
Given that the remedies available under each category are different, at least under
143 See The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from Climate
Change”, The Economist, 2015, available at: https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/ﬁles/
The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.pdf.
144 See, e.g., M. Carney, ‘A Transition in Thinking and Action’, speech at International Climate Risk
Conference for Supervisors, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam (The Netherlands), 6 Apr. 2018, avail-
able at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/mark-carney-speech-at-international-climate-
risk-conference-for-supervisors. Institutional investors are increasingly aware of these risks: see, e.g.,
letter signed by 95 institutional investors representing USD 11.5 trillion of assets under management
on 20 Dec. 2018, available at: https://www.iigcc.org/download/investor-letter-on-power-sector-decarbo-
nisa tion/?wpdmdl=1832&refresh=5cefc0f1d7f421559216369.
145 Barker et al., n. 18 above, p. 226.
146 Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Deringer, n. 140 above, p. 13. See also R. Sullivan et al., ‘Fiduciary Duty in the 21st
Century’, UNEP Report, Sept. 2015, available at: http://unepinquiry.org/publication/ﬁduciary-duty-in-
the-21st-century.
147 The latest IPCC report has revisited the conclusions reached in earlier reports and presents dire prospects
of limiting the warming of the planet to 1.5°C above pre-industrial times: IPCC, n. 6 above, para. D.1.
148 For an attempt to disentangle its intricate scope, see D.A. DeMott, ‘Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) 37(5) Duke Law Journal, pp. 879–924.
149 See, e.g., Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1, p. 16, para. F (per Millet LJ)
(Mothew).
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English law,150 I have decided to divide this section into two subsections. I will examine
the duty of reasonable care and skill ﬁrst and will then turn to ﬁduciary duties proper.
Duty of reasonable care and skill
The long-term nature of pension fund investments makes managers and trustees par-
ticularly vulnerable to litigation that seeks to challenge the discharge of their duty of
care and skill. For example, inMcVeigh, the claimant – a 23-year oldmember and bene-
ﬁciary of the Retail Employees Superannuation Trust (REST), the default industry pen-
sion fund for many retail workers in Australia – ﬁled a lawsuit against the fund for its
failure to provide him with adequate information relating to the fund’s exposure to
climate-related risks and any action being taken to address them.151 The claimant
argued that REST’s failure to provide him with adequate information about
climate-related risks and practices in place to manage those risks was preventing him
from understanding particular investments of REST and the beneﬁt entitlements of
his superannuation product, and from making an informed judgment about the man-
agement and ﬁnancial condition of REST.152 Such inadequate disclosure, the claimant
argued, would constitute a breach of the trustee’s duties under Australian statutory law
and he was seeking an injunction to require REST to provide him with the information
requested.153
In Lynn, a group of employees of Peabody Energy Corporation initiated litigation
against various entities and individuals who allegedly had responsibilities in the man-
agement and investment of the company’s employee retirement plans, building in part
on the New York AGO investigation that the company had settled in November
2015.154 The claimants alleged that the respondents had breached their statutory
duty of prudence in continuing to invest in the company’s shares despite their knowl-
edge of the dire prospects of the company that were partly a result of non-public infor-
mation about the impact of potential climate regulatory actions and the company’s
poor ﬁnancial situation.155 They requested the court to order the defendants to com-
pensate for all losses incurred by the retirement plans resulting from the defendants’
alleged breach, to impose a constructive trust on any amounts by which any defendant
was unjustly enriched as a result of the plan, and to award compensation in the amount
of any losses the plans suffered, to be allocated among the individual accounts of par-
ticipants in proportion to the accounts’ losses.
150 See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, s. 178(2).
151 Mark McVeigh v. Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd, Federal Court of Australia,
General Division, New South Wales District, Concise Statement ﬁled on 23 Jul. 2018, available at:
https://www.envirojustice.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/rest-concise-statement.pdf.
152 Mark McVeigh v. Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd, Federal Court of Australia, General
Division, New South Wales District, Amended Concise Statement ﬁled on 21 Sept. 2018, available at:
https://www.envirojustice.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/180921-Amended-Concise-Statement-
STAMPED.pdf.
153 Ibid., paras 13–8.
154 In re Peabody, n. 98 above.
155 Lori J. Lynn and Javier Gonzalez v. Peabody Energy Corporations and Others, US District Court of the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, 30 Mar. 2017, Case No. 4:15-cv-00916 (Lynn), pp. 8–9.
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
Javier Solana 25
The court dismissed the claim on grounds that the claimants had failed to substan-
tiate the standard applied by the US Supreme Court in non-public information claims:
‘that a prudent ﬁduciary could not have concluded that the alternative [e.g. to stop pur-
chasing the company’s stock] would do more harm than good’, and had failed to pro-
vide facts to support such an allegation.156 The fact that the company was ‘careening to
bankruptcy’ did not matter.157
Similarly, in Fentress, a group of current and former Exxon Mobil employees sued
senior corporate ofﬁcers who were ﬁduciaries of the ﬁrm’s savings plan for making an
imprudent investment in the company’s stock when they knew, or should have known,
that the value of the stock was inﬂated as a result of fraud and misrepresentation, and
the ﬁrm itself for its failure, as an appointing ﬁduciary, to monitor or remove the indi-
vidual ﬁduciaries.158 As in Lynn, the claimants in this case were building on an earlier
NewYork AGO investigation.159 Their main claimwas that the ﬁduciaries of the ﬁrm’s
savings plan had breached their duty of prudence on the basis of non-public informa-
tion.160 They sought very similar remedies to those sought by the claimants in Lynn.
The court granted the respondents amotion to dismiss on grounds that the claimants
had failed to establish that the price of carbon which Exxon had used to calculate the
value of its reserves ‘was a misrepresentation or did not account for the current or an
anticipated regulatory landscape’,161 including potential climate regulation. Even if
the respondents had known that reserves were overvalued before they wrote them
down, the court still granted the respondents motion to dismiss because the claimants
had failed to meet the same standard mentioned in Lynn.162
In the UK, pension funds are under growing scrutiny over their practices relating to
the management of climate-related risk. In February 2018, as part of the inquiry by the
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) into Green Finance, the EAC wrote to the 25
largest UK pension schemes to ask how they manage the risks that the climate crisis
poses to pension savings.163 Although the process revealed that some schemes were tak-
ing positive action to identify and manage climate-related risk, it also conﬁrmed ‘that
there is widespread misunderstanding amongst trustees on the scope of their ﬁduciary
156 Ibid., pp. 16–8.
157 Ibid., p. 14.
158 Bobby D. Fentress and Others v. Exxon Mobil Corporation and Others, US District Court of the
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, 30 Mar. 2018, Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-03484
(Fentress), pp. 1–4.
159 In re Exxon Mobil (NY), n. 98 above.
160 Fentress, n. 158 above, p. 6. The claimants also argued that the company had breached its duty tomonitor
the ﬁduciaries: ibid., pp. 26–7.
161 Ibid., p. 13.
162 Unlike in Lynn, however, the claimants in Fentress had provided several alternatives to holding company
stock that a prudent ﬁduciary could have considered. The court dismissed all of the claimants’ arguments:
ibid., pp. 17–26.
163 EAC, ‘MPs Seek Answers from Pension Funds on Climate Risk’, 5 Mar. 2018, available at:
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit-
committee/news-parliament-2017/green–ﬁnance-chairs-cooments-17-19.
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duty in relation to environmental risks’.164 On 10 August 2018, ClientEarth put 14 of
the UK’s largest pension funds on notice that they face an increasing risk of litigation,
such as before the Pensions Ombudsman, if trustees fail to develop their approach to
climate risk in line with improving data and market practices.165
The courts, in deciding the few cases involving pension funds in the US, were quite
emphatic in their dismissals and set a high bar for successfully challenging trustees’ dis-
charge of ﬁduciary duties based on non-public information claims. The cases involving
pension funds in Australia and the growing pressure on pension funds in the UK have
sharpened the focus on the procedural dimension of the ﬁduciary duties of trustees. As
of 31 December 2018, the court had not issued a decision onMcVeigh and no formal
complaints had been submitted before the Pensions Ombudsman in the UK. It is not
difﬁcult, however, to imagine that, if trustees were to incorporate climate-related
risks and other environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) considerations
into their decision-making processes and the ﬁnancial returns of the scheme were to
drop compared with the returns of alternative funds in the industry, pension fundmem-
bers might try to challenge the discharge of trustees’ ﬁduciary duties based, precisely,
on the incorporation of non-ﬁnancial considerations into the decision-making process.
The emergence of this type of ‘anti-regulatory’ climate case would nonetheless contrib-
ute towards clarifying the actual dimension of climate-related risks in trustees’ ﬁduciary
duties.
In addition to investment managers and trustees of pension funds and other invest-
ment funds, directors of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are bound by a similar
duty of care and skill.166 Although there are no reported cases of this sort, given the
litigation risk described in the preceding paragraphs it is not difﬁcult to imagine, for
example, legal action against a bank’s directors who decide to ﬁnance a large fossil
fuel extraction project amid growing evidence of the ﬁnancial risks associated with
the climate crisis.167 A detailed analysis of the feasibility of such legal action is beyond
the scope of this article.168 Sufﬁce it to say that a director who breaches his or her duty
to exercise reasonable skill and caremay be liable to compensate the company for losses
resulting from that breach.169
164 EAC, ‘Greening Finance: Embedding Sustainability in Financial Decision Making’, 7th Report of Session
2017–19, 4 June 2018, para. 34.
165 See, e.g., Letter from ClientEarth to Mr H.C. Mather, Chairman of Trustees, Shell Contributory Pension
Fund, 10 Aug. 2018, p. 1. This and the additional 13 letters are available at: https://www.documents.cli
entearth.org/library/download-category/pensions. The Pensions Ombudsman has legal powers to deal
with complaints of maladministration and disputes of fact or law concerning personal and occupational
pension schemes in the UK, and tomake decisions that are ﬁnal, binding and enforceable in court: Pension
Schemes Act 1993, ss. 146, 150.
166 Under UK law, see, e.g., Companies Act 2006, s. 174.
167 See, e.g., the brief description of the ﬁnancing arrangements of Kinder Morgan’s Canada business as
described in Greenpeace Canada, n. 106 above.
168 For a general analysis of directors’ duties of care and skill under UK law, seeM. Arnold, ‘Duty to Exercise
Reasonable Care, Skill, and Diligence’ in S.Mortimore (ed.),CompanyDirectors: Duties, Liabilities, and
Remedies (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 327–44.
169 A company may pursue a damages claim in conjunction with contractual claims for breach of the direc-
tor’s service contract: A. Zacaroli, ‘The Company’s Remedies for Breach of Directors’General Duties’, in
Mortimore, ibid., pp. 461–502, at 462.
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Fiduciary duties proper
There are no reported climate cases in ﬁnancial markets involving the breach of ﬁdu-
ciary obligations proper.170 That, however, is not indicative of the potential for such
duties to attract litigation in the future.171 With the exception of the duty of reasonable
care and skill, all duties of a director, as recognized in the UK Companies Act 2006, are
‘enforceable in the same way as any other ﬁduciary duty owed to a company by its
directors’.172 Section 172 of the Act, for example, requires directors to act in ways that:
[they will consider] would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the
beneﬁt of its members as a whole and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters)
to: (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, … (d) the impact of the
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct.
We can apply a similar rationale to that presented in relation to directors and trustees in
relation to their duty of reasonable care: amid the growing evidence of ﬁnancial risks
associated with the climate crisis, a bank’s directors who decide to increase the propor-
tion of carbon-intensive assets in the bank’s portfolio might be considered to be putting
the viability of the bank at risk in the long term. Moreover, given the growing popular-
ity of the TCFD among ﬁnancial market participants,173 a bank’s directors who refuse
to disclose climate-related risks might be exposed to allegations of eroding the bank’s
reputation for high standards of business conduct.
A detailed analysis of these claims is beyond the scope of this article.174 Sufﬁce it to
say that a breach of the directors’ duty to promote the success of the company may give
rise to a number of remedies, including avoidance of the controversial transaction, an
170 In Mothew, Millet LJ deﬁned a ﬁduciary as ‘someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of
another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and conﬁdence’
and her distinguishing obligation as one of loyalty:Mothew, n. 149 above, p. 18, para. B.
171 Indeed, preliminary legal assessments of the discharge of directors’ duties in the climate context of
Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the UK suggest that there is a legal basis for directors and trustees
to take account of physical climate change risk and societal responses to climate change. All reports are
available at: https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/publications.
172 Companies Act 2006, s. 178(2).
173 As of Sept. 2018, more than 500 ﬁrms from a broad range of sectors with a combined market capitaliza-
tion of over USD 7.9 trillion supported the TCFD. These included over 287 ﬁnancial ﬁrms, responsible
for assets of nearly USD 100 trillion: see TCFD, ‘2018 Status Report’, Sept. 2018, p. iv, available at:
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FINAL-2018-TCFD-Status-Report-092518.pdf.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions ﬁnancial regulators have endorsed the TCFD as a reference standard for
compliance with climate-related ﬁnancial disclosures: see, e.g., Prudential Regulation Authority,
‘Enhancing Banks’ and Insurers’ Approaches to Managing the Financial Risks from Climate Change’,
Supervisory Statement 3/19, Apr. 2019, para. 3.21.
174 For an analysis of the relevance of directors’ duties for climate litigation against fossil fuel companies in
the US, see L. Benjamin, ‘The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate Litigation and Directors’
Duties’ (2019)Utah Law Review (forthcoming). For a general analysis of the directors’ duty to promote
the success of the company under UK law, see M. Arnold &M. Haywood, ‘Duty to Promote the Success
of the Company’ in Mortimore, n. 168 above, pp. 279–313.
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injunction to prevent the transaction from completing, or a personal claim against the
directors for equitable compensation.175
3.7. Negligence
In addition to the negligence claims in tort against directors and trustees for breach of
their duty of reasonable care and skill, there is another kind of negligence claim under-
pinning climate cases in ﬁnancial markets: claims for compensation for loss and dam-
age resulting from the inaction of public authorities to address the climate crisis. For
example, an increase in the number of claims from policyholders might give insurance
companies an incentive to seek compensation from public authorities for failure to
implement reasonable risk prevention measures.176
If ﬁnancial supervisors were to assume the responsibility of monitoring the sustain-
ability of the operations of certain market participants,177 they would face similar risks.
The manifestation of climate-related ﬁnancial risks at one of the supervised institutions
could inﬂict losses on investors – for example, shareholders in a bank with a
carbon-intensive portfolio could be affected by a drop in the price of their shares or,
in a more radical example, the bank might eventually be put into resolution as a result
of excessive losses in non-performing loans extended to fossil fuel companies, thereby
leaving some of its creditors unable to recover their full claims. In these cases, share-
holders and creditors of the bank might attempt to seek compensation for those losses
from the relevant supervisory authorities on grounds that their negligent supervision
was the ultimate cause of their losses.178
3.8. Public Nuisance
Climate science has advanced considerably over the last decade. One of the most prom-
ising advances relates to the emerging science of extreme weather event attribution,
which analyzes the human impact on extreme weather events. In 2014, a landmark
paper traced 63% of cumulative worldwide emissions of industrial CO2 and methane
between 1751 and 2010 to 90 individual entities, the ‘carbon majors’.179 In several
175 Contractual claims against company directors for breach of their service contract may also be available:
Zacaroli, n. 169 above, pp. 461–76.
176 This is precisely the type of case that the science of extreme weather event attribution might promote: see
S. Marjanac & L. Patton, ‘Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science and Climate Change Litigation:
An Essential Step in the Causal Chain?’ (2018) 36(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law,
pp. 265–98, at 297. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. and Others v. Metropolitan Water
Reclamation District of Greater Chicago and Others, US District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, EasternDivision, Notice ofDismissal, 3 June 2014, CaseNo. 14-CV-03251. The claimants, how-
ever, ultimately withdrew the case.
177 This is one of the objectives of the European Commission’s Sustainable Finance Action Plan, n. 5 above.
178 There are precedents for this type of litigation in ﬁnancial markets. For example, after the ECB, in the
exercise of its resolution powers under the Single Resolution Mechanism, put a Spanish bank, Banco
Popular, into resolution in June 2017, some of the banks’ creditors sued the ECB before the CJEU in
an attempt to recover some of the losses they suffered. For a detailed analysis of these claims, see
Ramos & Solana, n. 38 above.
179 See R. Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and
Cement Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122(1) Climatic Change, pp. 229–41.
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instances since its publication local governments in the US have brought public nuis-
ance claims in tort against some of these carbon majors, seeking compensatory
damages.180 Similarly, a Peruvian farmer has brought a claim in tort against a carbon
major, asking the court to order the respondent to reimburse him for a portion of the
costs that he and the local authorities have incurred in establishing ﬂood protection,
that portion being equivalent to the claimant’s estimate of the respondent’s annual con-
tribution to global GHG emissions.181
Public nuisance claims so far have targeted emitters of GHG emissions as ‘direct pol-
luters’. Given the central role that ﬁnanciers play in the projects that are ultimately
responsible for those emissions by providing the necessary capital to develop the pro-
jects, the question arises whether ﬁnanciers could be held liable in tort as ‘indirect pol-
luters’. Establishing causation is one of the main legal hurdles that tort claimants face in
climate cases.182 Bringing ‘indirect polluters’ into the causal chain may be even more
difﬁcult, particularly when attempting to prove proximate and substantial causation.
Nevertheless, that causal link may be stronger in very speciﬁc ﬁnancial transactions,
such as project ﬁnance transactions, where a syndicate of several ﬁnanciers provides
ﬁnance to develop a very speciﬁc project. If the borrower faces tort liability claims to
compensate a third party for the harm or loss suffered as a result of the manifestation
of climate-related events associated with its project, identifying the ﬁnanciers who
funded the project may strengthen their link to the causal chain. In Ex-Im Bank, for
example, the court dismissed a claim against the bank for failure to conduct statutory
environmental assessments before providing ﬁnancial support partly because of the
relatively small contribution that the bank was making to the project.183 Whether
courts could adopt a different standard if the ﬁnancier were to be responsible for fund-
ing a signiﬁcant part of the project remains an open question.184
4. 
Climate litigation started to grow exponentially approximately ﬁve years ago. Today,
the number of cases being ﬁled continues to grow at a steady pace. Given the central
role that ﬁnance plays in economic development, the general absence of climate cases
in ﬁnancial markets amidst a growing trend of climate litigation was, at least, surpris-
ing. This trend seems to be changing: 14 out of the 46 cases identiﬁed in the database
search were ﬁled in 2018 alone.
180 Marjanac & Patton, n. 176 above, p. 278.
181 See Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen Regional Court, Case No. 2 O 285/15.
182 See D. Grossman, ‘Warming Up to aNot-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation’ (2003)
28(1) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 1–62, at 6–7, 22–7. For a more recent review see
G. Ganguly, J. Setzer & V. Heyvaert, ‘If At First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate
Change’ (2018) 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 841–86.
183 See Section 3.2.
184 The question is particularly relevant in those cases where ﬁnanciers exert considerable control over the
borrower, e.g., if they have one or several seats on the borrower’s board of directors or as a result of
loan covenants. Where such control exists, there may also be scope for claims of vicarious liability.
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Section 3 presented a classiﬁcation of the different types of claim that underpin all
reported climate litigation cases in ﬁnancial markets as of 31 December 2018 as well
as cases that might arise in the future. This ﬁnal section draws conclusions transpiring
from that classiﬁcation and outlines the questions that emerge for future research.
The ﬁrst thing to note about the cases is their time distribution: approximately 30%
of cases were ﬁled in 2018 alone, 26% in 2017 and 2016 together, and the remaining
44% prior to 2016. The data shows that climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets is on the
rise. The development of existing and forthcoming private and public sector regulatory
initiatives with the aim of promoting sustainable ﬁnance might usher in greater climate
litigation risk.185 In the near future, given the growing popularity of the TCFD Final
Recommendations and their more advanced stage of implementation, compared with
other regulatory initiatives to promote sustainable ﬁnance, disclosure obligations are
likely to attract much attention from potential claimants.
Secondly, most climate litigation cases in the ﬁnancial markets identiﬁed in this art-
icle have arisen in three jurisdictions: the US, Australia, and the UK. This is consistent
with trends identiﬁed in broader analyses of climate litigation. One possible expla-
nation is that climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets may be concentrated in countries
that host major international ﬁnancial hubs, but the absence of litigation in countries
like China and Japan suggests that there must be other reasons. One very important fac-
tor may be the geographical bias of the sources that I have consulted,186 but there may
be more complex factors buried in the different legal cultures of these countries that are
worth exploring.
Thirdly, a high proportion of cases relate to disclosure obligations. Among these, the
vast majority seem to fall into two categories: (i) cases motivated by shareholder reso-
lutions that aim to increase climate transparency, mostly in the US and Australia, with
many being ﬁled by companies in an attempt to forestall the resolutions; and (ii) formal
complaints to ﬁnancial supervisors concerning inadequate disclosure by ﬁrms of
climate-related risks, mostly in the UK. This division raises questions around the nature
of the enforcement. For example, it would be interesting to see how ﬁnancial supervi-
sors in the UK respond to existing complaints and to examine the scope of their future
investigations.
Fourthly, procedural claims are also very common in climate litigation cases in ﬁnan-
cial markets. Claimants focusing on the procedural obligations of decision makers may
represent an attempt to circumvent the general reluctance of courts to review the sub-
stance of decisions taken by business people and public authorities, particularly when
they involve complex and technical issues. Courts unhesitatingly perceive ﬁnance to be
a complex and technical issue.
The procedural claims, however, have produced mixed results, particularly in the
US. This is particularly surprising because in some cases, like Ex-Im Bank, the courts
gave preference to considerations of economic impact over the protection of adequate
185 The TCFD has indeed identiﬁed climate litigation risk as in important risk in ﬁnancial markets: TCFD,
n. 12 above, p. 5.
186 This bias is widely acknowledged: see, e.g., Setzer & Bangalore, n. 14 above, p. 181.
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decision making. In the EU, in contrast, the CJEU has identiﬁed procedural obligations
as strict deadlines that wide political discretion cannot ignore. This focus on procedural
claims might signal a way forward for regulators that aim to promote sustainable
ﬁnance, at least in the EU: rules that aim to inﬂuence the decision-making process of
private actors and public authorities may be the most effective way of integrating envir-
onmental concerns in ﬁnancial markets.
Lastly, cases like Abrahams and the Kinder Morgan IPO in Canada illustrate that
litigation, or the prospect of it, can be a very powerful tool to shape the incentives of
ﬁnanciers. In the case of the Kinder Morgan IPO, the company decided to amend its
prospectus to disclose climate-related information after the Alberta securities regulator
conﬁrmed that it would investigate Greenpeace’s complaint. Indeed, the most success-
ful litigation strategies are those that do not even reach the complaint stage. This, how-
ever, may pose a considerable challenge to future attempts to understand the potential
role that litigation could play in shaping the ﬁnancial sector response to the climate cri-
sis: the most effective strategies may be those that we cannot see.
With this caveat in mind, the classiﬁcation of climate cases in ﬁnancial markets also
reveals important questions for future enquiries into the potential of litigation to pro-
mote sustainable ﬁnance. The most obvious is the desirability to expand the geograph-
ical scope of the data that is available. In particular, given the growing prominence of
Chinese investors and ﬁnanciers in development projects around the world, it would be
useful to expand datasets to include Chinese cases. Building on this broader set of data,
a comparative analysis between climate litigation trends in different jurisdictions might
reveal insights into the potential role that courts and other law enforcement authorities
can play in shaping ﬁnance in each of these jurisdictions.
Another promising avenue for future academic enquiry is the examination of the
merits of some of the claims identiﬁed in this article in key jurisdictions. The academic
literature exploring climate litigation claims in ﬁnancial markets is still incipient and
tends to concentrate on three topics: ﬁduciary duties, disclosure, and the mandates of
central banks.187 This literature could be expanded with further academic enquiries
into the merits of other types of claim, such as public nuisance claims against ﬁnanciers
for their role as ‘indirect polluters’ and fundamental rights claims in ﬁnancial markets,
particularly in ‘anti-regulatory’ climate regulation cases. Such new enquiries could con-
tribute to enriching our understanding of these claims, which is currently built on
insights gained from general studies.188
As, and if, climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets continues to grow, a larger data set
might allow for the identiﬁcation of special features in this litigation – for instance,
whether some markets are more prone to litigation than others;189 whether litigants
resort more to ﬁnancial supervisors and other administrative bodies than to ordinary
courts; or whether they resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as
arbitration or mediation. The identiﬁcation of these special features might reveal that
187 See n. 18 above.
188 See, e.g., Grossman, n. 182 above; Peel & Osofsky, n. 19 above.
189 E.g., insurance companies appear to be particularly vulnerable to climate litigation: see Section 3.7 above.
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climate litigation dynamics in ﬁnancial markets are different from those identiﬁed in
other industries, such as the fossil fuel industry. Analysis of a greater number of ﬁnan-
cial sector climate cases might reveal that the regulatory pathways of climate litigation
in this context are different from those identiﬁed in climate litigation more generally.190
Lastly, if and as climate litigation in ﬁnancial markets continues to grow, empirical
studies could aim to quantify the economic impact of such litigation on ﬁnancial market
participants. Climate litigation is likely to impact upon ﬁrms on various fronts, includ-
ing legal fees, potential liability for compensation, and reputational harm.Moreover, at
a systemic level, climate litigation could have a destabilizing effect if, for example, the
economic impact of litigation puts large ﬁnancial institutions into ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
or if litigation results in the annulment of intervention by public authorities in speciﬁc
markets. These empirical analyses would contribute to our incipient understanding of
the relationship between climate change and ﬁnancial risk, but a much deeper examin-
ation of important aspects such as legal remedies, legal standing and enforcement
mechanisms will be needed. I hope that the typology of claims that I have presented
in this article can help to illuminate the ﬁrst steps in those quests.
190 See, e.g., Peel & Osofsky, n. 13 above; Setzer & Bangalore, n. 14 above.
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